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Abstrak 
Dewasa ini, Laut Cina Selatan ditandai dengan peningkatan belanja pertahanan 
dan  modernisasi militer oleh negara-negara sekitar yang dipicu oleh sifat agresif 
Cina di kawasan. Keagresifan Cina di Laut Cina Selatan merupakan bentuk 
ambisi Cina dalam menguasai kawasan tersebut yang merupakan bagian dari 
kepentingan nasionalnya. Keagresifan tersebut didukung oleh kehadiran dan 
proyeksi kekuatan militer Cina yang signifikan di kawasan. Jepang dan Filipina 
memandang keagresifan Cina di Laut Cina Selatan sebagai ancaman, dan 
sehingga memiliki kepentingan bersama untuk merespon ancaman tersebut. 
Diperhadapkan dengan keagresifan Cina, sejak 2012, Jepang dan Filipina telah 
melakukan diplomasi maritim guna menjaga status quo Laut Cina Selatan dari 
keagresifan Cina. Implementasi dari diplomasi maritim Jepang-Filipina dalam 
menyaingi keagresifan Cina di Laut Cina Selatan adalah bentuk „pendekatan 
proaktif‟ Jepang, mengikuti kebijakan “Proactive Contribution to Peace” yang 
dikumandangkan pemerintahan Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe. Pendekatan 
proaktif dalam penelitian ini merupakan bentuk konseptualisasi dari balance of 
power dan cooperative maritime diplomacy.   
 
Kata kunci: Laut Cina Selatan, keagresifan Cina, diplomasi maritim, hubungan 
bilateral Jepang-Filipina, pendekatan proaktif 
 
Abstract 
Nowadays, the South China Sea has been identified with increasing defense 
spending and military modernization of the neighboring countries which are 
driven by China‟s assertiveness in the region. China‟s assertive behavior in the 
South China Sea is an expression of its growing ambition over the region which 
is part of its core interests. China‟s assertiveness is buoyed by its significant 
military presence and power projection in the region. Japan and the Philippines 
are having converging threat perceptions towards China‟s assertiveness in the 
South China Sea as well as sharing common interests to balance the assertive 
China. Contested with China‟s assertive behavior, since 2012, Japan and the 
Philippines have been conducting dynamic maritime diplomacy in order to 
safeguard the status quo of the sea from the assertive China. The implementation 
of Japan-Philippines maritime diplomacy in responding to China‟s assertiveness 
in South China Sea is a form of “proactive approach” by Japan, following the 
“Proactive Contribution to Peace” banner resounded under Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe administration. The proactive approach in this research features the 
concept of “balance of power” and “cooperative maritime diplomacy”. 
 
Keywords: South China Sea, China‟s assertiveness, maritime diplomacy, Japan-
Philippines bilateral relations, proactive approach 
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Introduction 
The South China Sea has been a 
center of attention in international affairs 
for the dynamics of its geopolitics. Its 
strategic significance to the world is 
exposed through the abundant amount of 
resources and potentials such as fishery 
stocks, minerals and hydrocarbon, and also 
its position as a strategic commercial 
shipping lane (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2016; Cronin, 2013). 
However the current dynamics of its 
security environment is identified with 
territorial tensions among China, 
Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Viet 
Nam, and Malaysia; as shown in Figure 1 
(Bender, 2015). 
Figure 1. The South China Sea Power 
Struggle 
 
According to analytics firm IHS Markit in 
2016, the tensions in the South China Sea 
would keep escalating and drive an 
increase of defense spending in the Asia 
Pacific region for the upcoming five years 
by nearly 23 percent; rising to $533 billion 
in 2020 from the previously $435 billion 
in 2015 (IHS, 2016). This pour of expense 
and military modernization are indicating 
states‟ responses not merely towards the 
escalating tensions but also to China‟s 
assertive behavior in the region 
(Dominguez & Mazumdaru, 2015). 
In that regards, the Philippines as one 
of the claimant states against China in the 
tension has expressed its concern towards 
China‟s assertive behavior in the South 
China Sea. Meanwhile, Japan has likely 
shown its response towards the assertive 
China in the region despite not being a 
claimant state. On 24 July 2016 in 
Vientiane, Laos, Japan Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe made a statement, “I am 
seriously concerned with the continuing 
attempts to change unilaterally the status 
quo in the East and South China Sea,” as 
his distress towards China‟s escalating 
aggressive claims (Al Jazeera, 2016). On 
the other hand, throughout the past years 
after coming into power in 2012, Japan 
under Shinzo Abe has endorsed Japan‟s 
vision to be the promoter of the rules and 
defender of the commons, and also 
reiterated the banner of “Proactive 
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Contribution to Peace” that this article 
describes as “proactive approach”.  
Having an increasing convergence of 
security concerns in the face of China‟s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea, 
Japan and the Philippines have remarkably 
developed maritime diplomacy in the past 
few years since 2012 (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a). The maritime diplomacy was 
further characterized with the elevation of 
Japan-Philippines “strategic partnership” 
into “strengthened strategic partnership. 
Hence this article particularly discusses the 
implementation of Japan-Philippines 
maritime diplomacy which is the 
realization of Japan‟s “Proactive 
Contribution to Peace” banner in response 
to the assertive China in the South China 
Sea. 
The Assertive China in South China Sea 
China has been increasingly 
identified with “assertiveness” since 2009 
(Gilsinan, 2015), in what year China 
submitted its claim statement and nine-
dashed line map to the United Nations for 
the first time (Mollman, 2016): 
“China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in 
the South China Sea and the 
adjacent waters, and enjoys 
sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant 
waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof. The above 
position is consistently held by 
the Chinese government, and is 
widely known by the 
international community.” 
PRC to UN (Mollman, 2016) 
The above claim statement marked a 
unilateral behavior of China in pursuing its 
core interest. China has then further 
asserted its sovereignty claim over the 
South China Sea by enforcing annual 
fishing ban, conducting regular maritime 
patrols, and performing scientific surveys 
and military exercises in the disputed area 
(Zhou, 2015). 
The whole discourses of the 
assertive China surfaced as a reaction to 
China‟s transition into a more active and 
aggressive China, that arguably took place 
in 2009-2010. According to the 
conceptualization by Richard Q. 
Turcsányi, Chinese assertiveness is “the 
behavior in which China actively pursues 
its interests and acts boldly towards 
achieving its goals, even if they contradict 
the interests and/or security of other 
countries”(Turcsanyi, 2017,13)  . The 
narrative of the assertive China clearly 
advocates that China does something 
different than other countries, hence “only 
those policies of China that are 
considerably different, qualitatively or 
quantitatively”, from those other claimants 
will be regarded as assertive. This 
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conceptualization also requires the policies 
to be different (more assertive) than the 
proceeding policies, to be regarded as 
assertive. 
Among the narratives of Chinese 
assertiveness in the South China Sea, here 
are some of the allegedly assertive actions 
in the South China Sea as identified based 
on the conceptualization of “assertiveness” 
by Richard Q. Turcsányi: 
Table 1. Allegedly Assertve Actions of China 
in South China Sea 2009-2017
 
 
Source: Richard Q. Turcsányi (2017) 
China‟s assertiveness in the region is 
supported and enabled by the steady 
capacity and infrastructure buildings, 
especially military facilities on artificial 
islands that allow China pursuing more 
control over the South China Sea. The 
construction of artificial islands and 
infrastructures such as runways, support 
buildings, loading piers, and possible 
satellite communication antennas, has 
urged other countries to question the aim 
of the projects (Dingli, et al., 2016). As 
matter of fact, those intense constructions 
give China the potential to deploy 
aircrafts, missiles, and missile defense 
system to any of its constructed islands, as 
well as to actualize the possibility of Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that 
greatly improve China‟s power projection 
in the region (Dingli, et al., 2016). 
For over a quarter century, China 
also has broadly reinforced its military 
forces by maintaining great increases in its 
defense budget (Ministry of Defense of 
Japan, 2017b). Though China‟s detailed 
military budget allocation can hardly be 
tracked down due to its lack of 
transparency, China‟s military expenditure 
is discussed to have been invested in 
whole kinds of weaponry while pursuing a 
comprehensive military modernization 
program, which also then contributes to its 
assertive approach in the South China Sea 
(Dominguez & Mazumdaru, 2015). 
Meanwhile in 2017, according to 
The Global Firepower which provides an 
annual evaluation of the world‟s military 
powers, China was positioned on the third 
rank worldwide in the overall factors; 
manpower, air power, army strength, navy 
strength, natural resources (petroleum), 
logistics, finance, and geographical values 
(The Global Firepower, 2017). This
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position is indicating that China has 
significant military presence in the South 
China Sea that potentially discourages 
future military activities addressed to 
China (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 
2017a) and benefits China‟s expansion in 
the South China Sea. 
Table 2. Relevant Military Hardware of 
Important Actors in South China Sea Region
 
Source: The Global Firepower (2017) 
Japan-Philippines Converging Threat 
Perceptions towards Assertive China in 
South China Sea 
China‟s assertive manner in the 
South China Sea has subsequently 
conjured Japan and Philippine‟s reactions. 
The Philippines has firmly addressed 
Chinese behavior in the South China Sea 
as aggressive and assertive, and also 
perceived the assertive China in the region 
as a certain threat for the country: 
“The Philippines 
considers China‟s 
behavior towards the 
Philippines and other 
States bordering the South 
China Sea to be 
aggressive rather than 
cooperative.” 
“The Philippines argues 
that China‟s assertiveness 
in its claim to historic 
rights over all the waters, 
seabed, and subsoil within 
the so-called „nine-dash 
line‟ has interfered with 
the Philippines‟ enjoyment 
and exercise of its 
sovereign  rights and 
jurisdiction under the 
Convention.” 
(Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2016) 
The assertive China has been 
projected as threats by both Japan and the 
Philippines as seen through five 
dimensions: Structural, Historical, 
Geopolitical, Socio-Cultural, and 
Economic as conjured by Robert O. 
Tilman on threat perceptions concept. 
Table 3. Japan-Philippines Converging Threat 
Perceptions towards China’s Assertiveness in 
South China Sea 
 PHILIPPINNE JAPAN 
STRUCTURAL Clear, urgent Clear, urgent 
HISTORICAL 
Longstanding 
dispute in South 
China Sea 
Longstanding 
dispute in East 
China Sea 
GEOPOLITICAL 
Close physical proximity; 
China‟s strong power projection in 
SCS 
SOCIO-
CULTURAL 
Low favorability towards China; 
China as greatest threat 
ECONOMIC Threatening  Threatening 
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As displayed in Table 3, in 
structural dimension, the Philippines 
government communicated the receipt of 
threats from the Chinese assertiveness with 
statement “China‟s actions constitute a 
clear and urgent threat to the rights and 
interests of the Philippines…” that was 
delivered in the arbitration issued by the 
Philippines against China on the South 
China Sea dispute (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2016). In historical dimension, 
China and the Philippines have long been 
involved in the South China Sea dispute 
over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough 
Shoal, in which their interactions on the 
dispute shape the projection of China as a 
long-term security threat to the Philippines 
(Sokolsky, Rabasa, & Neu, 2001). In 
geopolitical dimension, the physical 
proximity between China and Philippines‟ 
power struggles over the South China Sea 
is relatively close, especially when 
considering the position of their military 
outposts in the disputed areas. In socio-
cultural dimension, Pew Research Center 
released “2017 Global Attitude Survey” in 
which 47% of Filipinos saw China as a 
major threat to their country, 30% saw it as 
a minor threat, and 8% took it as no-threat; 
while 66% of the Filipinos worry 
particularly about China‟s growing 
military power and deployments in the 
region (Silver, 2017). The economic 
dimension is shown by Philippine‟s 
statement “China has violated the 
Convention by: (a) interfering with the 
exercise of the Philippines‟ rights under 
the Convention, including with respect to 
fishing, oil exploration, navigation, and 
the construction of artificial islands and 
installations” (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2016). 
Meanwhile for Japan, in structural 
dimension, the threat perception started to 
be seen when the conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) parliaments 
insisted the 2015 Defense White Paper of 
Japan to include the aerial photograph of 
China‟s extensive island-building in South 
China Sea, which later included photos of 
Johnson South Reef and Subi Reef 
reclamations – showing more alarming 
Chinese assertiveness in Japan‟s structural 
bodies view (Drifte, 2016). In historical 
dimension, Japan has historically been 
involved in tensions with China since the 
First Sino-Japanese War until today‟s East 
China Sea dispute; in which China‟s 
assertiveness is in tandem with that of in 
South China Sea (Shoji, 2014), hence 
Sino-Japanese longstanding dispute in East 
China Sea contributes to shaping the threat 
perceptions in the context of South China 
Sea. In geopolitical dimension, the 
physical proximity of Japan and China is 
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very close, especially when the competing 
military personnel around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also added 
into consideration. In socio-cultural 
dimension, Japanese favorability view 
towards China goes as low as 13% and 
90% of the people regard China‟s growing 
military as bad thing (Ministry of Defense 
of Japan, 2017b; Vice, 2017). In economic 
dimension, Japan‟s national economic 
interests in South China Sea are 
jeopardized by Chinese assertiveness 
which involves unilateral fishing ban, 
foreign oil companies‟ ban, and extensive 
sea patrols.  
The Implementation of Japan-
Philippines Maritime Diplomacy (2012-
2017) 
Prior to 2012, Japan and the 
Philippines had not experienced a dynamic 
security partnership due to Japan‟s 
constraints in the pursuant, which was the 
Article 9 of Japan‟s 1947 Constitution 
(Cruz de Castro, 2017a) despite their tight 
diplomatic and economic relations. In 
2011, the Philippines and Japan made a 
“strategic partnership” which more 
extensively addressed security issues 
including maritime affairs and South 
China Sea dispute, although the maritime 
cooperation then remained limited 
(Trajano, 2013). After assuming power in 
2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
then instigated the strengthening of both 
countries‟ “strategic partnership” through 
“four initiatives” where the maritime 
security cooperation was one of the main 
pillars in the meeting with then President 
Benigno Aquino (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, 2013; Trajano, 2013). 
The initiative was further formally 
declared and construed in Japan-
Philippines “Strengthened Strategic 
Partnership” in 2015, in which both 
countries‟ maritime cooperation has been 
progressively expanding and taken into 
priority of their relations. The 
implementation of Japan-Philippines 
maritime diplomacy since 2012 has been 
pursued through: 
1) Agreements and Joint 
Statements 
The maritime diplomacy of Japan 
towards the Philippines is 
formalized in the “Strengthened 
Strategic Partnership” which is also 
strengthened with various 
agreements that support both 
countries‟ commitment in the 
maritime cooperation. Amongst the 
agreements are: 
 “The 2012 Statement of 
Intent on Defense 
Cooperation and Exchanges 
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between the Department of 
National Defense and the 
Ministry of Defense” 
 “Memorandum on Defense 
Cooperation and Exchanges 
between the Ministry of 
Defense of Japan and the 
Department of National 
Defense of the Republic of 
the Philippines” on 29 
January 2015 
 “Japan-Philippine Joint 
Statement” on 26 October 
2016 
 “Japan-Philippines Joint 
Statement on Bilateral 
Cooperation for the Next 
Five Years” on 30 October 
2017 
2) Contribution and Coordination 
in Regional and International 
Arena 
Japan has been actively promoting 
cooperation with the Philippines that 
concerns on the regional and 
international situations and security. 
This activity is pursued through 
exchange of information; involvement 
and exchange in both Peacekeeping 
Operations Center of the AFP and 
Japan Peacekeeping Training and 
Research Center; as well as enhancing 
cooperation in multilateral framework 
such as ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers‟ 
Meeting (ADMM-Plus) (Ministry of 
Defense of Japan, 2012). Other than 
the active involvement in the meetings 
and coordination in regional and 
international level, the partnership 
between Japan and the Philippines also 
highly values rule of law. 
3) Political-Security Dialogues, 
Consultations, and Exchanges 
The Philippines and Japan have 
been actively conducting high-level 
meetings and consultations to 
reinforce their security cooperation in 
the face of China‟s military 
assertiveness, in which the two 
countries discuss and share strategies 
in handling the challenges posed by 
China‟s behavior in the East and 
South China Seas (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a). According to the 2012 
Statement of Intent on Defense 
Cooperation and Exchanges between 
the DND of the Philippines and the 
Japan MOD, both countries are 
committed to conduct defense 
cooperation and exchanges through: 
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Table 4. Political-Security Dialogues & 
Exchanges in Japan-Philippines Maritime 
Diplomacy 
Source: Ministry of Defense of Japan 
(2012) 
4) Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR) 
Japan has been constantly 
contributing to securing peace in 
Mindanao area in the Philippines, and 
the HA/DR program is part of the two 
countries‟ maritime cooperation focus. 
In actualizing their HA/DR programs, 
both countries are focusing on the 
capacity building that is being buoyed 
by Japan. The JSDF is coordinating 
closely with the AFP in assisting the 
capacity building project, by 
conducting unit-to-unit exchanges and 
discussions, joint exercises, and even 
occasional and mutual ship visits 
between the PN and JMSDF (Ministry 
of Defense of Japan, 2012; 2015a). 
5) Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) Loans 
According to ODA Portfolio 
Review by the Philippines in 2016, 
Japan through JICA was the biggest 
source of loans with 45 percent share 
(USD 5.47 billion) of overall loan 
portfolio which was amounting to USD 
15.60 billion; 66 loans (USD 12.21 
billion) and 400 grants (USD 3.39 
billion) (National Economic and 
Development Authority Philippines, 
2017a). Among the projects covered by 
Japan, there are two of them that focus 
on the capacity building for PCG: (i) 
Maritime Safety Capability 
Improvement Project for the Philippine 
Coast Guard (PCG; (ii) The Project for 
Enhancement of Coastal 
Communication System (National 
Economic and Development Authority 
Philippines, 2017a). In December 
2013, JICA and the Philippines signed 
an ODA loan agreement that was 
specifically addressed for “Maritime 
Safety Capability Improvement Project 
for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)” 
which was to be conducted through 
two phases. In the first phase, in 2013, 
JICA provided an ODA loan up to 
18.732 billion yen to the Philippines 
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(JICA, 2013). The project that aimed to 
improve the PCG capabilities was later 
continued in the second phase in 
October 2016, in which both JICA and 
the Philippines signed an ODA loan 
agreement up to 16.455 billion yen 
(JICA, 2016).   
6) Arms Transfer and Capacity 
Building Assistance 
In July 2013, while Japan was 
pursuing a strengthened strategic 
partnership with the Philippines, both 
countries reached an agreement that 
Japan would export ten patrol boats to 
the Philippines through a yen loan as 
part of ODA provision, aiming to 
increase the capacity of the PCG 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2013). The later Japan-Philippines 
“Memorandum on Defence 
Cooperation and Exchanges” in 
January 2015 and “Action Plan for 
Strengthening of the Strategic 
Partnership” in June 2015 further 
reiterated both countries‟ commitments 
in defense equipment cooperation 
(Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015b; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2015). Until today, the development 
activities of Japan-Philippines 
cooperation in arms transfer are, 
among others: 
 May 2016, agreement on 
Japan to lease five JMSDF 
TC-90 surveillance planes 
to the PN (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a). 
 September 2016, agreement 
on transferring MSDF TC-
90 training aircrafts to 
Philippines; notified that 
first of ten 40-meter 
multirole response vessels 
(MRRVs) had arrived in 
Philippines with the 
remaining to steadily follow 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan, 2016b). 
 26 October 2016, 
agreement on ODA loans 
for: (i) two-large scale 
patrol vessels to 
Philippines, (ii) steadily 
maintaining the previous 
ten-patrol vessels provided 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan, 2016a). 
 August 2017, Japan MOD 
reportedly offered its PC-3 
patrol aircraft and spare 
parts for UH-1 helicopters 
to the Philippines (Kelly & 
Kubo, 2017). 
 12 October 2017, the PCG 
ordered the first multi-role 
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response vessel (MRRV), 
PCGS Tubbataha, which 
will be used for patrol, 
search and rescue, and law-
enforcement operation in 
Philippine‟s maritime 
territory (Cruz de Castro, 
2016a). 
7) Naval Exercises and JMSDF 
Ships’ Port Visits 
In a press conference by Japanese 
Defense Minister Nakatani in 2015, the 
minister disclosed the conduct of joint 
exercise between the JMSDF and PN 
on 12 May 2015 (Ministry of Defense 
of Japan, 2015c). The joint naval 
exercise was part of the realization of 
security agreement signed by both 
countries in January 2015, on the 
implementation of further Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) 
development and enhancement of their 
maritime cooperation (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a). 
Later on 21 June 2015, another 
joint training was achieved between 
JMSDF and PN when JMSDF P3-C 
Orion arrived at the Philippines (Cruz 
de Castro, 2017a). This activity 
marked an increasing tempo of Japan-
Philippines maritime cooperation and 
was reportedly focused on enhancing 
both countries‟ fleet skills and the 
interoperability of their navies in 
HA/DR operations (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a). Other than conducting joint 
naval exercises, JMSDF ships have 
also made several port visits to the 
Philippines; 4 visits in 2012, 2 visits in 
2013, 7 visits in 2015 (Cruz de Castro, 
2017a).   
8) Projection of Philippine-Japan 
Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) 
Japan and the Philippines have 
been notably exploring the prospect of 
SOFA that would enable Japan‟s 
forces to access Philippine‟s military 
bases, including conducting larger 
military exercises with the AFP (Cruz 
de Castro, 2016b). In 2015 during then 
President Aquino‟s visit to Japan, the 
talks about Japan-Philippines VFA 
were publicly announced and 
addressed as an importance to boost 
Japan-Philippines security partnership 
(Parameswaran, 2017). The presence 
of a SOFA in Japan-Philippines 
maritime security is projected to be 
highly advantageous for the 
Philippines, because the agreement 
“would give the Philippines access to 
training from Japan‟s highly 
developed maritime forces, repair 
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services for the PN and Coast Guard, 
and maritime reconnaissance data; all 
these become more important as the 
Philippines acquires additional 
Japanese equipment” (Simon, 2015). 
Meanwhile Japan would be granted 
access of refueling and basing facilities 
in the Philippines, to later perform a 
joint patrol over lager area of South 
China Sea (Cruz De Castro, 2015). 
Japan-Philippines Maritime Diplomacy 
as Proactive Approach in Responding to 
the Assertive China in South China Sea 
The Philippines, fully aware of its 
lack on the capability to balance China, 
recognizes the importance of having 
internal balancing and to strengthen its 
relations with other powers that share the 
same interests: 
“It is plain to see that our 
defense capabilities are no 
match for any economic giant 
who will attempt to touch our 
territories [West Philippine 
Sea]. There are other ways of 
tipping the balance of power 
more favorably towards 
weaker nations, however. 
… the Department will 
continue to work on the 
attainment of a credible 
defense capability for the 
AFP, while at the same time 
enhance our ties and defense 
cooperation with nations, 
who are on the same page 
with us as far as keeping the 
peace in the region is 
concerned. New ties are also 
being established and 
nurtured with friendly and 
peace loving nations.” 
(Department of National 
Defense Philippines, 2015) 
In order to also maintain the status 
quo of the South China Sea, Japan, on the 
other hand, offers relevant assistance to the 
Southeast Asian countries, including the 
Philippines, by supporting their capacity 
buildings and urging the countries in the 
region to cooperate and adhere to the 
UNCLOS principles (Nirmala, 2016). In 
that regards, Japan‟s maritime diplomacy 
with the Philippines is part and parcel of 
the country‟s proactive approach in 
international affairs. The proactive 
approach is enabled by and based on the 
“Proactive Contribution to Peace” banner 
adopted by Japan, with a clear vision to 
proactively engage in international affairs: 
“The key of national security 
is to create a stable and 
predictable international 
environment, and prevent the 
emergence of threats. It is 
thus necessary for Japan to 
realize an international order 
and security environment 
that are desirable for Japan, 
by playing an even more 
proactive role in achieving 
peace, stability and 
prosperity of the 
international community as a 
“Proactive Contributor to 
Peace” based on the 
principle of international 
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cooperation.” (National 
Security Strategy, 2013) 
Japan‟s engagement with the 
Philippines under Shinzo Abe has entered 
another stage of cooperation from 
economic-social approach to political-
security approach (Nirmala, 2016). In 
April 2017, Japan‟s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs released “Priority Policy for 
Development Cooperation FY 2017” in 
which Japan aims to contribute more 
proactively to securing peace, stability and 
prosperity of the international community 
by promoting strategic and effective 
development cooperation (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017). In that 
regards, Japan has shown its latest priority 
policy for the development cooperation, 
from which the writer sees its application 
in Japan‟s maritime diplomacy with the 
Philippines: 
Figure 1 - Japan's Priority Policy for 
Development Cooperation Key Area 1
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan (2017)   
The above diagram shows that 
Japan‟s maritime diplomacy with the 
Philippine is a practice of Japan‟s 
“Proactive Contribution to Peace” as seen 
through how Japan promotes the notion of 
“stability, prosperity and rule of law” not 
only through dialogues. When previously 
Japan was criticized for its “checkbook 
diplomacy”; using financial power such as 
economic aid and investment for 
increasing diplomatic ties; Japan under 
Shinzo Abe took a leap towards direct 
contribution to peace such as; capacity 
building for PCG, arms transfer, and even 
joint naval trainings as well as ODA loans 
addressed to maritime security (Hornung, 
2015).  
Meanwhile, if seen through 
Christian Le Mière‟s maritime diplomacy 
conceptualization (Figure 3), Japan‟s 
strategic partnership with the Philippine 
leans towards cooperative maritime 
diplomacy concept. Rather than using 
coercion as its primary tool, cooperative 
maritime diplomacy makes use of 
attraction and values as its tool (Mière, 
2014, p. 8), which supports Japan‟s 
proactive approach. Referring to Le 
Mière‟s conceptualization, Japan-
Philippines maritime diplomacy is 
adopting the following forms of 
cooperative maritime diplomacy: 
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Figure 3. Japan-Philippines Cooperative 
Maritime Diplomacy  
 The previous figure shows that 
Japan-Philippines maritime diplomacy is 
aiming to enhance diplomatic influence 
and strengthening the relations with the 
Philippines through its multilayered 
exchanges and port visits; enhance the 
capacity, knowledge, and compatibility 
with the Philippine‟s navies through 
HA/DR and joint trainings; while also 
build harmonization and confidence 
among other nations through exercises and 
joint maritime security operations. 
In that regards, cooperative 
maritime diplomacy has the opportunity to 
deter any potential rival by showing their 
confidence and synchronization although it 
is supposedly not the main aim – which is 
actually to entice or reassure other 
governments (Mière, 2014, p. 58). 
Accordingly, in cooperative maritime 
diplomacy, the strong power may also 
support the weak against a possible 
aggressor; because compelling the other 
does not have to always take place in 
coercive maritime diplomacy, though it 
also does not necessarily mean that the 
diplomacy needs to be asymmetric (Mière, 
2014, p. 58). 
Conclusion 
To conclude this article, it can be 
stated that the assertive China in the South 
China Sea poses as a security challenge for 
Japan and Philippines, which further 
conjure responses from both countries. In 
that regards, Japan-Philippines maritime 
diplomacy that started remarkably since 
2012 is the joint response towards the 
assertive China in the region. The 
implementation of this maritime 
diplomacy is a form of proactive approach 
by Japan in the sense that it is in line with 
the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” 
banner proclaimed under Shinzo Abe 
administration. The promotion of 
democracy, stability, prosperity, and rule 
of law is clearly pursued in the Japan-
Philippines maritime diplomacy, which is 
also followed with economic aid, capacity 
building for PCG, and arms transfer; some 
of which were previously constrained 
under Japan‟s pacifist constitution.  
In that regards, the article finds that 
the concept of balance of power is applied 
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in the implementation of Japan-Philippines 
maritime diplomacy, in which the act does 
not feature formal alliance and direct 
challenge towards the opposed military 
preponderance, but rather is pursued 
through diplomatic efforts, economic 
efforts and coordination, and increasing 
military cooperation and technological 
transfers. Meanwhile, according to 
Christian Le Mière‟s maritime diplomacy 
conceptualization, this maritime diplomacy 
is applying cooperative maritime 
diplomacy, which although seems subtle, it 
has potential to balance China comes from 
showing confidence and synchronization 
that could potentially deter the possible 
aggressor.  
About the Authors 
Ivena Ersandi obtained her 
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations 
at the School of International Relations, 
Faculty of Humanities, President 
University, Indonesia. During her study, 
she was actively involved in Model United 
Nations (MUN) and national essay 
competitions, with several achievements 
brought home. Currently, she is a research 
assistant at President Center for 
International Studies (PRECIS), President 
University. She has great interest in 
Diplomacy Studies. 
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita is a 
professor of International Relations at the 
School of International Relations, 
President University. He is also a Senior 
Researcher at President Center for 
International Studies (PRECIS), He 
obtained his MA in International Relations 
and Strategic Studies from Lancaster 
University and his Ph.D. from Flinders 
University, Adelaide. He is also actively 
involved with the Indonesian Ministry of 
Defense and the Indonesian National 
Resilience Council (Dewan Ketahanan 
Nasional). 
Reference 
Al Jazeera. (2016, September 8). Beijing's 
South China Sea claims scrutinised 
at summit. Dipetik October 14, 
2017, dari Al Jazeera News and 
Agency: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/20
16/09/south-china-sea-row-
overshadows-asean-summit-
160907051502873.html 
Bender, J. (2015, August 10). China wants 
to build giant floating islands in 
the South China Sea. Dipetik 
December 18, 2017, dari Business 
Insider: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ch
ina-to-build-giant-floating-islands-
2015-8/?IR=T 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. (2016, March 11). 
Tensions in the South China Sea 
explained in 18 maps. Dipetik 
 
 
 
 Page 189 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
September 30, 2017, dari Business 
Insider: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/te
nsions-in-the-south-china-sea-
explained-in-18-maps-2015-
1/?IR=T/#1a-political-map-1 
Cronin, P. M. (2013). The Strategic 
Significance of the South China 
Sea. Managing Tensions in the 
South China Sea. Center for 
Strategic & International Studies. 
Cruz De Castro, R. (2015, June 10). 
PRESIDENT AQUINO‟S VISIT TO 
TOKYO BOOSTS PHILIPPINE-
JAPAN PARTNERSHIP IN 
MARITIME SECURITY. Dipetik 
January 25, 2018, dari Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative: 
https://amti.csis.org/president-
aquinos-visit-to-tokyo-boosts-
philippine-japan-partnership-in-
maritime-security/ 
Cruz de Castro, R. (2016a). The Duterte 
Administration‟s Foreign Policy: 
Unravelling the Aquino 
Administration‟s Balancing 
Agenda on an Emergent China. 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs. Dipetik December 6, 2017, 
dari nal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs: http://nbn-
resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:n
bn:de:gbv:18-4-10136 
Cruz de Castro, R. (2016b, October 19). 
President Duterte Maintains 
Philippine-Japanese Partnershp as 
He "Pivots" to China. Dipetik 
January 25, 2018, dari Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative: 
https://amti.csis.org/president-
duterte-maintains-philippine-
japanese-partnership-pivots-china/ 
Cruz de Castro, R. (2017a, April). 21st 
Century Japan-Philippines 
Strategic Partnership: Constraining 
China's Expansion in the South 
China Sea. Asian Affairs: An 
American Review, 44(2), 31-51. 
doi:10.1080/00927678.2017.12967
43 
Department of National Defense 
Philippines. (2015). Quest for 
Peace. Philippine Defense 
Newsletter, 5(1). Dipetik January 
25, 2018, dari Department of 
National Defense Philippines: 
http://dnd.gov.ph/pdf/PDN/PDN%
20Volume%205%20Issue%201%2
02015.pdf 
Dingli, S., Economy, E., Haass, R., 
Kurlantzick, J., Smith, S. A., & 
Tay, S. (2016). China's Maritime 
Dispute. Dipetik January 2, 2018, 
dari Council on Foreign Relations: 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chi
nas-maritime-disputes#!/ 
Dominguez, G., & Mazumdaru, S. (2015, 
December 18). Are South China 
Sea tensions triggering an arm 
race? Dipetik October 4, 2017, dari 
Deutsche Welle: 
http://www.dw.com/en/are-south-
china-sea-tensions-triggering-an-
arms-race/a-18927467 
Drifte, R. (2016). Japan's Policy towards 
the South China Sea - Applying 
"Proactive Peace Diplomacy"? 
Frankfurt am Main: Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt. 
Dipetik December 2, 2017, dari 
 
 
 
 Page 190 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HS
FK/hsfk_publikationen/prif140.pdf 
Gilsinan, K. (2015, September 25). Cliché 
of the Moment: „China‟s 
Increasing Assertiveness‟. Dipetik 
October 14, 2017, dari The 
Atlantic: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/intern
ational/archive/2015/09/south-
china-sea-assertiveness/407203/ 
Hornung, J. W. (2015, October 27). 
Gauging Japan's 'Proactive 
Contributions to Peace'. Dipetik 
January 25, 2018, dari The 
Diplomat: 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/ga
uging-japans-proactive-
contributions-to-peace/ 
IHS. (2016, June 1). Growing Tensions 
Around South China Sea to Drive 
Defence Spending in APAC. 
Dipetik October 3, 2017, dari IHS 
Markit: 
http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-
release/aerospace-defense-
security/growing-tensions-around-
south-china-sea-drive-defence-
spend 
JICA. (2013, December 16). Signing of 
Japanese ODA Loan Agreement 
with the Republic of the 
Philippines. Dipetik January 25, 
2018, dari JICA: 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/new
s/press/2013/131216_01.html 
JICA. (2016, October 26). Signing of 
Japanese ODA Loan Agreement 
with the Republic of the 
Philippines: Further strengthening 
the maritime safety capability of 
the Philippine Coast Guard. 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
JICA: 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/new
s/press/2016/161026_01.html 
Kelly, T., & Kubo, N. (2017, August 11). 
Japan said to offer chopper parts 
to Philippines as counter to China. 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
Japan Times: 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news
/2017/08/11/national/politics-
diplomacy/japan-said-offer-
chopper-parts-philippines-counter-
china/#.Wmy4cKiWbIV 
Mière, C. L. (2014). Maritime Diplomacy 
in the 21st Century. New York: 
Routledge. 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2012). 
STATEMENT OF INTENT ON 
DEFENSE COOPERATION AND 
EXCHANGES BETWEEN DND 
OF PHILIPPINES AND MOD OF 
JAPAN. Dipetik January 25, 2018, 
dari Ministry of Defense of Japan: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youji
n/2012/07/02_st_e.pdf 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2015a, 
January 29). Joint Press Release. 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
Ministry of Defense of Japan: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youji
n/2015/01/29a_jpr_e.pdf 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2015b, 
January 29). MEMORANDUM ON 
DEFENSE COOPERATION AND 
EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE 
MOD OF JAPAN AND THE DND 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES. Dipetik January 25, 
 
 
 
 Page 191 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
2018, dari Ministry of Defense of 
Japan: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youji
n/2015/01/29a_memo_e.pdf 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2015c, May 
12). Press Conference by the 
Defense Minister Nakatani (08:45-
09:02 A.M. May 12, 2015). Dipetik 
January 25, 2018, dari Ministry of 
Defense of Japan: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conf
erence/2015/05/12.html 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2017a). A 
Strategic analysis of the South 
China Sea territorial issues. 
Dipetik December 19, 2017, dari 
Japanese Ministry of Defense: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol
/SSG/topics-column/images/t-
049/049-02.pdf 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2017b). 
Defence White Paper 2017. Dipetik 
Deecember 6, 2017, dari Ministry 
of Defense: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_pa
per/2017.html 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
(2013, July 23). Japan-Philippines 
Summit Meeting. Dipetik 
November 11, 2017, dari Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page
6e_000121.html 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
(2015, June 4). Japan-Philippines 
Joint Declaration: A Strengthened 
Strategic Partnership for 
Advancing the Shared Principles 
and Goals of Peace, Security, and 
Growth in the Region and Beyond. 
Dipetik January 20, 2018, dari 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/p
h/page4e_000280.html 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
(2016a, October 26). Japan-
Philippines Joint Statement. 
Dipetik January 24, 2018, dari 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/00019
8399.pdf 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
(2016b, September 6). Japan-
Philippines Summit Meeting. 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
Minsitry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/p
h/page3e_000568.html 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
(2017, April). Priority Policy 
Development Cooperation FY2017. 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/00025
9285.pdf 
Mollman, S. (2016, July 7). The line on a 
70-year-old map that threatens to 
set off a war in East Asia. Dipetik 
October 2, 2017, dari Quartz: 
https://qz.com/705223/where-
exactly-did-chinas-nine-dash-line-
in-the-south-china-sea-come-from/ 
National Economic and Development 
Authority Philippines. (2017a). 
ODA Portfolio Report Review 
2016. Dipetik January 25, 2018, 
 
 
 
 Page 192 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
dari National Economic and 
Development Authority 
Philippines: 
http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/ODA-
2016-As-of-August-22-2017.pdf 
Nirmala, M. (2016). Japan's New ASEAN 
Diplomacy: Strategic Goals, 
Patterns, and Potential Limitations 
under the Abe Administration. 
International Journal of Social 
Science and Humanity, 6(12), 952-
957. Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari 
http://www.ijssh.org/vol6/780-
HS0067.pdf 
Parameswaran, P. (2017, February 16). 
What's Next for Japan-Philippines 
Defense Relations Under Duterte? 
Dipetik January 25, 2018, dari The 
Diplomat: 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/w
hats-next-for-japan-philippines-
defense-relations-under-duterte/ 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016, 
July 12). Award in the South China 
Sea Arbitration (The Republic of 
the Philippines v. the People's 
Republic of China). Dipetik 
January 15, 2018, dari Permanent 
Court of Arbitration: https://pca-
cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/
PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf 
Shoji, T. (2014). The South China Sea: A 
View from Japan. Dipetik 
November 8, 2017, dari National 
Institute for Defense Studies - 
Ministry of Defense: 
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/
publication/kiyo/pdf/2014/bulletin_
e2014_7.pdf 
Silver, L. (2017, October 16). How people 
in Asia-Pacific view China. Dipetik 
January 17, 2018, dari Pew 
Research Center: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/10/16/how-people-in-
asia-pacific-view-china/ 
Simon, S. (2015, September). US-
Southeast Asia Relations: Courting 
Partners. Comparative 
Connections, 16(2), 53-64. Dipetik 
January 25, 2018, dari CSIS: 
https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publicatio
n/1502qus_seasia.pdf 
Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., & Neu, C. R. 
(2001). The Role of Southeast Asia 
in U.S. Strategy Toward China. 
Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
Diambil kembali dari 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monogr
aph_reports/MR1170.html 
The Global Firepower. (2017). 2017 
Military Strength Ranking. Dipetik 
January 2, 2018, dari The Global 
Firepower: 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/c
ountries-listing.asp 
Trajano, J. C. (2013, August 5). Japan-
Philippines Strategic Partnership: 
Converging Threat Perception. 
Dipetik November 11, 2017, dari 
RSIS Nanyang Technological 
University: 
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/2034-japan-
 
 
 
 Page 193 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
philippines-strategic-
pa/#.WgcwgmiCzIU 
Turcsányi, R. Q. (2017). Chinese 
Assertiveness in the South China 
Sea. Cham: Springer International 
Publishing. 
Vice, M. (2017, August 23). In global 
popularity contest, U.S. and China 
– not Russia – vie for first. Dipetik 
February 20, 2018, dari Pew 
Research Center: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/23/in-global-
popularity-contest-u-s-and-china-
not-russia-vie-for-first/ 
Zhou, W. (2015, June). China's growing 
assertiveness in the South China 
Sea. Dipetik October 28, 2017, dari 
Elcano Royal Institute: 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/
wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elc
ano/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-
pacific/ari60-2015-chinas-growing-
assertiveness-in-the-south-china-
sea 
 
